

# „Bio-Generika“

Dr. Klaus Maleck  
Chief Financial Officer & VP Business Development  
BioGeneriX AG

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
- **The Opportunity: Market Size and Potential**
  - Entrance Barriers to the FoB Market
  - Marketing FoBs
  - Rentability in the FoB Market
  - Conclusion
-

- Definition: „**Biogenerics (Follow-on biologics) are Copycats of Biopharmaceuticals, i.e. Pharmaceuticals, whose active agents are achieved by biotechnological Methods using recombinant Cell Cultures.**“
  
- Approval process distinguishes FoBs from generics:  
Centralized procedure mandatory, two basic legal bases
  - **Biosimilar approach** (EC2001/83): comparative toxicology; bioequivalence studies, one limited pivotal, comparative efficacy study (caveat: statistical power and assay sensitivity)
  
  - **Stand-alone approach:** non-clinical part without comparator, phase I/II/III, against comparator (no reference citation)

# Opportunity: The Global Pharma Market




- Biologics are growing at twice the rate of „ Small Molecules“ (Rx Market)



Source: IMS Health, BioGeneriX Projection

# Share of New Approvals (US)




Source: FDA

# Top Global Biologics




## Sales 2005

in b\$



**Biotech drugs offer a huge market potential, also after patent expiry**


# Top 10 European Biotech-Products 2004 in m\$



**The average sales figure of a top10 Biotech product in Europe is ~ 900 Mio €**


Source: IMS Health/ Company Reports/BGX estimates

# Top 10 Biopharmaceuticals in the German Market



Source: IMS/ BGX - \*No Direct Sales

## Generika: Milliardenumsätze mit patentfreien Arzneimitteln



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CHMP released „final“ regulatory guidelines for

1. Insulin
2. G-CSF
3. hGH
4. Epoetin,

will come into effect on June, 1st 2006


Despite these guidelines no guarantee for a „golden“ development plan

- Therefore:
  - early Scientific Advise from EMEA is highly recommended
  - in the next 3-4 years flexibility on scientific / clinical arguments at CHMP might be possible – and case by case decisions likely

# Development Timelines EMEA



- From the first Steps until Launch it could take approx. 6-9 Years




The development timelines are similar to NBE development, only the risk of failure is smaller

# Development Costs




in Mio \$



**Due to high regulatory and GMP-constraints, development costs for FoBs are a multiple of those usually found in the chemical generics business**

Source: Maleck, K., Pollano, F. EBR 2001


# Passing Barriers to Compete in the FoB Market



# Best Owner Biosimilar Products




Owner	Patent Know-how	Biotech	Partnering	Capital	Legislation	Market access
Pharma	◐	◐	●	◐	◐	●
Biotech	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐
Generics (EMEA/FDA)	●	○	◐	●	◐	◐
Generics (others)	◐	○	◐	◐	○	○
Specialist bio-generic company	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	○
Biotech-manufacturer	◐	●	◐	◐	◐	○




Big Pharma would be able, but is not willing to enter; All others need to complement gaps through partnering  
 Capital and market access are/will be strongest selectors

# Competitors in the Field



In Europe, depending on the products, up to four FoB developments will compete on market shares. Rather than „perfect competition“, an **oligopol** with limited price erosion will prevail for some time.

# Five-Forces eines „biosimilar“ Markts



- The Opportunity: Market Size and Potential
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# Marketing FoBs: Between generics and ethicals




- FoBs are primarily special care products, sold to key accounts in specialized therapeutic areas
- Scientific selling required
- High price rebates not possible
- But: No new messages/innovations

A new Marketing concept is needed




- Description along the 4 „P“s:


<b>Product</b>	<b>Promotions</b>
<b>Price</b>	<b>Place</b>



# „Product“: SWOT-Analyse eines typischen „biosimilar“




Stärken	Schwächen
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Gleiche Qualität wie Originator</li><li>-Preisgünstiger</li><li>-Produktbündeln</li><li>-Starkes Branding</li></ul> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Schwache Stellung im Spezialvertrieb</li><li>-Evtl. keine unabhängige Produktion und reduzierte Preisflexibilität</li><li>-Kein signifikanter „value add“</li></ul>
Chancen	Bedrohungen
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Vertriebspartnerschaften</li><li>-Marktausweitung</li><li>-Evtl. geringere Nebenwirkungen als Originator</li><li>-Patentgeschützte 2nd gen. Produkt</li></ul> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Folgemedikationen/neue Dosierungen mit kompletter Marktumstellung</li><li>-Therapieveränderungen</li><li>-Schwierige Akzeptanz im Markt</li><li>-Starke Konkurrenz und Preiserosion/Zwangsrabatt</li><li>-Patentverletzungen</li></ul> 




## „Pricing“: Microeconomics



- Limited number of competitors
- From monopolistic to oligopolistic competition (not perfect competition)
- No marginal costing, no commodity pricing
- interdependent pricing reaction scheme (prisoner's dilemma, signalling)
- Fight for market shares
- Promotion-intense; branding important




The market for patent-free biologics will likely be an attractive, but expensive niche market; Spending does not end with obtaining the market authorization




## “Pricing”: Historic example Gensulin



- Compared to Originator Products the max. Price Difference is 24%; Over three years, Price erosion is 30%.






## „Pricing“: Price elasticity




Optimum of volume expansion vs. price reduction?

- Example: FSH sales after change in reimbursement in Germany



Price elasticity: -16% (inelastic demand), corresponding to literature values for pharmaceutical drugs (-22%\*)

\* Nicholson (1995); Microeconomic Theory, 6th ed.)



## „Pricing“: Price elasticity




Applying the price elasticity:


A price reduction of 30% would decrease the market by 20% (but increase the volumes by roughly 14%).

### Change in market sales following price reduction

schematic



Don't reduce prices, use other marketing tools




## „Place“: Europäisches Vertriebsnetz




Kunden:  
Key account/Tender

Absatz:  
Direktgeschäft

Logistik:  
Geschlossene Kühlkette




Beispiel: Gate Pharmaceuticals für den Vertrieb des Tevtropins in den USA




# „Promotion“: Key decision makers




## Zielgruppen im Rahmen der Kaufentscheidung




Für jede Zielgruppe müssen spezifische Verkaufsargumente identifiziert werden



# „Promotion“: Selected Vehicles




# Marktpositionierung von FoBs: Preisnachlass vs. Marketingkosten



Quelle: nach Tremml (2004)

# Marketing FoBs: 4 P's Summary



# Agenda

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
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## Conclusion on the revenue side

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- Price erosion likely to be modest
- Sales volume increase as seen with classical generics, resulting in a small total turnover reduction; patient pools
- Market share of all FoB-Products likely to be smaller than for classical generics, but still significant
- Market share divided among only a few players




This market can be an attractive niche for generics companies; for some originators, the margins will likely be too small

It depends on the cost...


# Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (SGA)

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- Most biotech products are sold in restricted markets by scientifically trained key accounters
- Highly competitive direct marketing
- Limited number, well informed patients




Usual generic sales organization will not do the job,  
need for a specialized unit/company




High costs for set-up and operations (25% of net sales; or bottom-up)

# Cost of Manufacturing: CoGS




API manufacturing represents max. **14%** of the total costs



API manufacturing represents max. **42%** of the total costs

Manufacturing becomes a key business driver only in high-volume, mature markets (e.g.commodity goods, or bio-generics?)

# Conclusion on the cost side



In order to fulfill the EMEA-/ICH- and GMP-requirements during development, and to meet the marketing needs, total costs of successfully bringing FoBs into the market are high and cannot be significantly reduced.

# A Simple Model for Return on Investment in the FoB-Market



in Mio €


Launch FoBs

		Development							Commercialization						
Year		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Market	1000	1.020	1.040	1.061	1.082	1.104	1.126	1.149	1.172	1.195	1.219	1.243	1.268	1.294	1.319
Price erosion	30%	1.020	1.040	1.061	1.082	1.104	1.126	1.149	879	896	853	870	888	906	924
Market expansion	40%	1.020	1.040	1.061	1.082	1.104	1.126	1.149	1.142	1.165	1.195	1.219	1.243	1.268	1.293
Market share	10%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3%	6%	9%	10%	10%	10%	10%
<b>Sales</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>129</b>
Development cost	60	2	4	7	8	18	20	1							
COGS	15%	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	16	18	19	19	19	20
SGA	25%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	17	27	30	31	32	32
<b>Cash Flow</b>		<b>-2</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>-18</b>	<b>-20</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>77</b>
DCF	14%	-2	-4	-5	-5	-11	-10	-3	6	13	19	20	18	16	14

NPV **81**

(8 years of sales)

# Measures for Success: EVA for FoBs



# Sensitivity Analysis: Results



■ Critical Market Share (of a 1000 Mio € Market):	3.3%
■ Critical Market Size:	350 Mio €
■ Critical Price Erosion:	80%
■ Latest Launch Date:	2.5 Y after 1st FoB
■ Critical Development costs:	180 Mio €

Under the presented assumptions, the business case is very robust.

- Several **levers** can be used to make it even more valuable:
- Global partnering (to originators)
- Additional patient benefit (multi-dose, pen, sustained release, new combinations, new indications,...)
- Bundling
- Scientific key accounting rather than price-driven generic distribution

**To enter the FoB market remains, however, a risky and expensive undertaking**

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# Conclusion

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- Successful FoB companies have as a minimum a profound expertise in biotechnology, the financial strength, patent knowledge and access to pharmaceutical marketing including a trusted brand and product portfolio
- The current entrance barriers limit the number of FoB companies to 3 – 4 per molecule
- The price erosion will at first not be dramatical, but the return remains small due to high development and marketing costs
- The macroeconomy is likely to profit less compared to chemical generics
- In the long-run, the investments might be wise to create a mid-range margin niche business, compared to a low-margin generic business

# FUTURE OUTLOOK

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- The bio-generic industry saw a peak in numbers of companies, but is now starting to sort out
- Cost leadership might become an issue, depending on the price erosion witnessed (number of competitors), but this is unlikely to occur in the beginning
- Originators in Europe seem not to defend their markets by patent disputes, but rather by building up regulatory hurdles, marketing tools, and switches to second generation developments. No early entry deals were done up to now.
- Generic industry is likely to reduce investments due to margin pressure in their main business, although the RoI is most likely positive